bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-faqnpm
bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-faq is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-12987) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 35.5.3). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-faq (npm)
What this malware does
On require() of this package, index.js loads adapter.js which invokes bootstrap() at module load. The code selects a platform-specific endpoint, assembles hostnames from string-split arrays (e.g. ["oob-worker.cf100-","416.wo","rkers.d","ev"].join("")) to resolve to anonymous Cloudflare Workers subdomains (oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev), fetches an opaque binary via https.get, writes it to /var/tmp or %TEMP% under disguised names (.cache<rnd> on Unix, dotnet_diag_<rnd>.exe on Windows to masquerade as dotnet diagnostics), chmods 0755, and spawns it detached with stdio ignored via cp.spawn("/bin/sh",["-c", fp+" &"], {detached:true, stdio:"ignore"}).unref(). A fallback covert channel reassembles the payload from base64-encoded chunks stored in DNS TXT records at sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, and net.dl.wel1.ru (reading a chunk count from c.<domain> then concatenating <n>.<domain> TXT responses) to bypass HTTP egress filtering. No hash or signature verification is performed on the fetched bytes. Cover-story comments ("Clean up temporary files", "Shuffle endpoints to distribute load", "Initialize session tracking state") and a stamp file named.analytics_state present the behavior as telemetry; opt-out environment variables DISABLE_TELEMETRY/ANALYTICS_OPT_OUT/DO_NOT_TRACK short-circuit the dropper, functioning as an evasion switch. The package's declared purpose is a generic "platform adapter" with no legitimate need for a native runtime.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-faq (version 35.5.3). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-faq across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-faq is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-faq was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-faq before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-faq-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.