bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-article-authornpm
bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-article-author is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-12979) that executes malicious code on install (malicious version 35.3.3). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-article-author (npm)
What this malware does
On require of the package, index.js loads shim.js which reconstructs a set of Cloudflare Workers hostnames (oob-worker.cf101-adf/102-baf/99-9b3/103-070.workers.dev) and DNS-TXT fallback domains (sdk/ext/pkg/net.dl.wel1.ru) from array fragments joined at runtime, downloads an opaque binary over HTTPS (with a DNS-TXT chunked base64 covert channel as fallback when HTTPS egress is blocked), writes it to /tmp or the Windows temp directory under disguised names such as.cache<rnd> or dotnet_diag_<rnd>.exe, chmods it to 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh -c '<path> &' or cmd /c start. Destination hostnames are obfuscated via string-split-and-join to evade static detection. Installing or importing this package results in execution of attacker-controlled native code on the host with the installer's privileges.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-article-author (version 35.3.3). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-article-author across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-article-author from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-article-author was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-article-author before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-article-author-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.