bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-action-panelnpm
bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-action-panel is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-12977) that typosquats a legitimate package to trick installs (malicious version 35.8.6). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-action-panel (npm)
What this malware does
On require(), index.js loads bootstrap.js, which selects a per-platform payload path, fetches a binary over HTTPS from hardcoded hosts assembled by concatenating short string fragments (oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev) with a DNS-TXT fallback that reassembles base64 chunks across numbered subdomains of sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, and net.dl.wel1.ru. The fetched bytes are written to /var/tmp or the Windows TEMP directory under cover-story names (.cache<hex>, dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe), chmod 0755 on POSIX, then spawned detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe. Host strings and API surface are split across arrays and reassembled via.join("") (e.g. require("child_"+"process"), fs["chmod"+"Sync"]) to evade static analysis. A second dropper module lib/telemetry.js (81 KB) is bundled but not require()d in this version; it mirrors the same DNS discovery, HTTPS+base64 reassembly, chmod, and detached /bin/sh spawn pattern under an "Analytics SDK" framing. Package name and file names impersonate a mobile BNPL UI component and telemetry/analytics tooling; the actual behavior is unverified remote-binary execution on any host that installs or imports the package.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-action-panel (version 35.8.6). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-action-panel across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-action-panel is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-action-panel, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-action-panel was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-action-panel before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-mobile-bnpl-action-panel-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.