bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-videonpm
bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-video is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-12975) that executes malicious code on install (malicious version 35.7.3). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-video (npm)
What this malware does
index.js require()s bootstrap.js on module load. bootstrap.js reassembles obfuscated hostnames via array-join (e.g. oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev), fetches a platform-specific binary via https.get, writes it to /var/tmp or %TEMP% under a disguised name (.cache<hex> on Unix, dotnet_diag<hex>.exe on Windows), chmods 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh -c '<path> &' or cmd.exe /c start /b. When HTTPS fetch fails, _bootstrap.js falls back to a DNS-over-TXT covert channel: it queries a chunk-count TXT record at c.<domain> against sdk.dl.wel1.ru / ext.dl.wel1.ru / pkg.dl.wel1.ru / net.dl.wel1.ru, then reassembles numbered base64-encoded TXT records into executable bytes that are written to disk and spawned. Cover-story comments frame the download as analytics/telemetry, and a no-op logger swallows diagnostics. Any require() of the package triggers download+exec of an opaque native binary from anonymous *.workers.dev endpoints on the installer's host.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-video (version 35.7.3). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-video across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-video from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-video was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-video before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-video-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.