bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-text-blocknpm
bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-text-block is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-12972) that typosquats a legitimate package to trick installs (malicious version 35.7.1). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-text-block (npm)
What this malware does
On require of this package, index.js loads compat.js which unconditionally bootstraps a dropper. It selects a platform-specific payload path, fetches an opaque executable from one of three Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev) with a DNS-TXT chunked-base64 fallback via sdk.dl.wel1.ru / ext.dl.wel1.ru / pkg.dl.wel1.ru, writes it to /tmp or %TEMP% under a disguised name (.cache<hex> on POSIX, dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows), chmods 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe /c start /b. No hash or signature verification is performed. Destination hostnames are reconstructed at runtime by joining fragmented string arrays (e.g. ['sdk.dl.','wel1','.ru'].join(''), ['oob-worker.cf102-','baf.','work','ers','.d','ev'].join('')), and the dropped-file names impersonate benign diagnostic tooling (dotnet_diag). A stale-marker gates re-execution across imports.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-text-block (version 35.7.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-text-block across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-text-block is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-text-block, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-text-block was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-text-block before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-text-block-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.