bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-tablenpm
bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-table is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-12971) that executes malicious code on install (malicious version 35.3.7). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-table (npm)
What this malware does
Requiring bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-table transitively loads compat.js, which auto-invokes a start() routine at module load. The routine downloads a platform-specific native executable over HTTPS from Cloudflare Workers subdomains (oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev), with a DNS TXT fallback under *.dl.wel1.ru for base64-encoded payload delivery. Hostnames are reconstructed at runtime by joining split string fragments to hide them from casual inspection. The downloaded binary is written to /tmp (Unix) as a hidden file named.cache<hex> or to %TEMP% (Windows) under a masquerading name like dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe, chmod 0755, and spawned detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe. A stamp file named.analytics_state and 'telemetry'/'graceful degradation' labels form a cover story. The delivered binary is opaque, unpinned, unverified, and the fetch destinations do not match the package publisher and are unrelated to the package's stated BNPL-table purpose.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-table (version 35.3.7). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-table across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-table from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-table was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-table before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-table-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.