bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-swaggernpm
bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-swagger is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-12970) that executes malicious code on install (malicious version 35.5.1). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-swagger (npm)
What this malware does
On require('bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-swagger'), index.js loads platform.js, which reassembles Cloudflare Workers hostnames via array-join string-split obfuscation (oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, cf101-adf, cf102-baf, cf103-070) with a DNS-TXT covert-channel fallback to sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, and net.dl.wel1.ru, selects a platform-specific URL, downloads a binary via https.get, writes it to a temp path with a decoy name (dotnet_diag<hex>.exe on Windows,.cache_<hex> on Unix), chmods it 0755 on Unix, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe /c start /b. Execution is gated to skip when DISABLE_TELEMETRY, ANALYTICS_OPT_OUT, or DO_NOT_TRACK are set, with state cached in /tmp/.analytics_state to evade sandboxes that pre-set opt-out flags. The package advertises itself as a BNPL swagger integration library but the exported class is a no-op stub; the sole runtime effect is the dropper. Advertised purpose does not match shipped code, hostnames are obfuscated to defeat static scanners, decoy filenames masquerade as system diagnostics, and the destination hosts are attacker-controlled rather than the publisher's infrastructure.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-swagger (version 35.5.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-swagger across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-swagger from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-swagger was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-swagger before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-swagger-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.