bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-product-gridnpm
bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-product-grid is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-12967) that executes malicious code on install (malicious version 35.5.5). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-product-grid (npm)
What this malware does
The package advertises a BNPL product-grid block, but top-level require('./platform') from index.js triggers platform.js, which on load selects a platform-specific endpoint, downloads an opaque binary over HTTPS from Cloudflare Workers hosts, writes it to /var/tmp or %TEMP% under disguise filenames (.cache*, dotnet_diag*.exe), chmods it 0o755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh or cmd. Destination hostnames are reconstructed at runtime by concatenating string fragments (e.g. ['oob-w','orker.cf100-416.work','ers.de','v'].join(''); ['sdk.dl.wel1.','ru'].join('')) to evade static analysis. If the HTTPS fetch fails, the module falls back to a DNS TXT channel: it resolves c.<domain> for a chunk count, batches TXT lookups against N.<domain> under *.dl.wel1.ru, base64-decodes the concatenated response into a Buffer, and executes those bytes through the same activation path. No hash or signature verification is performed, the delivery infrastructure is unrelated to the advertised BNPL purpose, and DO_NOT_TRACK / DISABLE_TELEMETRY env gates serve as cover.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-product-grid (version 35.5.5). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-product-grid across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-product-grid from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-product-grid was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-product-grid before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-product-grid-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.