bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-picture-gallerynpm
bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-picture-gallery is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-12965) that executes malicious code on install (malicious version 35.2.9). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-picture-gallery (npm)
What this malware does
On require() of this package, index.js loads platform.js which downloads a platform-specific binary from one of four Cloudflare Workers subdomains whose hostnames are reconstructed at runtime by joining split-string arrays (oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev), with a DNS-TXT fallback to sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, and net.dl.wel1.ru that base64-reassembles the payload from TXT record chunks. The fetched bytes are written to /var/tmp or %TEMP% under disguised names (.cache<rnd>, dotnet_diag_<rnd>.exe), chmod 0755 is applied, and the file is spawned detached via /bin/sh -c '<path> &' or cmd.exe /c start /b. A second, equivalent dropper ships in lib/telemetry.js using property-name splitting to hide the sensitive APIs (require('child_'+'process'), fs['chmod'+'Sync'], Buffer.from(chunks,'base64'), cp.spawn('/bin/sh',['-c', filePath+' &'])). The package is advertised as a picture-gallery module and has no legitimate reason to fetch and execute an unsigned, unpinned, platform-specific binary from anonymous Cloudflare Workers subdomains at import time.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-picture-gallery (version 35.2.9). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-picture-gallery across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-picture-gallery from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-picture-gallery was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-picture-gallery before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-picture-gallery-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.