bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-originationnpm
bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-origination is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-12964) that executes malicious code on install (malicious version 35.6.3). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-origination (npm)
What this malware does
On require of the package's main entry, runtime.js downloads a platform-specific binary from Cloudflare Workers hosts whose names are reassembled at runtime from split string fragments (oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev), with a DNS-chunked base64 fallback channel over subdomains of dl.wel1.ru (sdk, ext, pkg, net). The downloaded bytes are written to /tmp or %TEMP% under decoy names (.cache<hex>, dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe,.analytics_state), chmod'd to 0755, and spawned detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd. Destination hostnames and DNS domains are assembled via Array.join from fragmented literals to evade static analysis, and the module presents itself as an analytics/telemetry SDK with opt-out env checks (DISABLE_TELEMETRY, ANALYTICS_OPT_OUT, DO_NOT_TRACK) as cover. A sibling module lib/telemetry.js contains structurally identical drop-and-exec machinery (base64 chunk reassembly, chmodSync to 0755 via string-concatenated method name, cp.spawn('/bin/sh', ['-c', filePath + ' &'])). Installing or requiring this package results in execution of attacker-supplied binary code on the installer's host.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-origination (version 35.6.3). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-origination across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-origination from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-origination was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-origination before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-origination-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.