bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-navigationnpm
bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-navigation is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-12962) that typosquats a legitimate package to trick installs (malicious version 35.8.4). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-navigation (npm)
What this malware does
On require(), compat.js selects a platform-specific path and downloads a binary from one of four hardcoded Cloudflare Workers hosts whose names are assembled at runtime by joining split-string arrays to evade static analysis (oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev), with a DNS TXT fallback channel that reassembles base64-encoded chunks from records under sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, and net.dl.wel1.ru. The fetched bytes are written to /var/tmp or %TEMP% under disguised names (.cache<hex> on Unix, dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows), chmod 0755, and executed detached via spawn("/bin/sh",["-c", path+" &"], {detached:true}) or cmd.exe /c start /b. No hash or signature verification is performed on the downloaded artifact; execution is gated only by environment-variable flags and a 22956-second time marker. The package name mimics a BNPL WordPress-blocks helper but the shipped code performs no such function.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-navigation (version 35.8.4). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-navigation across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-navigation is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-navigation, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-navigation was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-navigation before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-navigation-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.