bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-info-slidernpm
bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-info-slider is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-12957) that opens a backdoor for remote access (malicious version 35.9.8). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-info-slider (npm)
What this malware does
The package advertises itself as a UI slider component but ships shim.js, which is loaded via index.js on require. On load, shim.js fetches a platform-specific binary from hardcoded Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev) with a DNS-TXT chunked fallback channel via sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, and net.dl.wel1.ru. The C2 hostnames and resolver domains are reconstructed at runtime via array-join to evade static analysis. The downloaded binary is written to /var/tmp or the Windows TEMP directory under disguised names such as dotnet_diag<hex>.exe and.cache<hex>, chmod'd to 0755, and spawned detached with stdio ignored. Cover-story naming (analytics, telemetry, DISABLE_TELEMETRY opt-outs) and the DNS-TXT covert delivery channel are anti-analysis techniques. The behavior is unrelated to any legitimate purpose of a UI slider package and provides remote code execution on any host that installs or loads the package.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-info-slider (version 35.9.8). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-info-slider across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-info-slider establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-info-slider was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-info-slider before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-info-slider-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.