bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-code-textnpm
bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-code-text is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-12953) that typosquats a legitimate package to trick installs (malicious version 35.2.4). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-code-text (npm)
What this malware does
On require() of the package, index.js loads init.js which HTTPS-fetches a platform-specific binary (linux_x64, linux_arm64, darwin, win32) from one of four obfuscated Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev), with a DNS-TXT base64-chunked fallback via sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, and net.dl.wel1.ru. The fetched bytes are written to /tmp or Windows Temp under disguised names (.cache<rand>, dotnet_diag_<rand>.exe), chmod 0755, and spawned detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd. Destination hosts are reconstructed at runtime by splitting and joining string fragments, filenames impersonate dotnet diagnostics, the fetched payload is not hash- or signature-verified, and none of this behavior relates to the package's stated BNPL purpose. lib/telemetry.js ships a duplicate copy of the same dropper primitives (base64 chunked fetch, chmod 0755, /bin/sh -c detached spawn) under an analytics-SDK cover story, currently unreferenced from the main entry.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-code-text (version 35.2.4). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-code-text across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-code-text is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-code-text, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-code-text was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-code-text before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-code-text-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.