bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-anchornpm
bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-anchor is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-12949) that executes malicious code on install (malicious version 35.6.5). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-anchor (npm)
What this malware does
On require('bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-anchor'), index.js loads helpers.js which selects a per-platform payload, downloads an opaque binary from one of several Cloudflare Workers subdomains (oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev), with a DNS-TXT fallback to sdk.dl.wel1.ru, writes the payload to /tmp/.cache<hex> on Unix or %TEMP%\dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows, chmods it 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe. Destination hostnames are assembled from split string arrays (e.g. ['oob-worker.cf99','-9b3.workers.d','ev'].join('')) to evade static analysis. A hidden idempotency marker (/tmp/.analytics_state or %TEMP%\analytics_state) and env-var opt-outs (DISABLE_TELEMETRY, ANALYTICS_OPT_OUT, DO_NOT_TRACK) plus filenames like dotnet_diag_<uid>.exe give the loader a telemetry/diagnostics cover story. The fetched destinations are anonymous workers.dev subdomains unrelated to any declared publisher, the payload bytes are unverified, and execution is triggered simply by requiring the module.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-anchor (version 35.6.5). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-anchor across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-anchor from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-anchor was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-anchor before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-independent-bnpl-anchor-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.