What does the bnpl-blocks-feature-partners malware do?

index.js unconditionally require()'s./_ext.js, which on load selects a platform-specific endpoint, fetches an opaque binary from Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker.cf10{1,2,3}-*.workers.dev) reassembled from split string literals, with a DNS-TXT chunked base64 fallback via *.dl.wel1.ru subdomains, writes the payload to /var/tmp/.cache_ on Unix or %TEMP%\dotnet_diag_ .exe on Windows, chmods it 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe /c start /b. Network destinations and sensitive API names (child_process, chmodSync) are reconstructed at runtime from split-string arrays to evade static scanners. No integrity check, no hash/signature verification, filename disguises (.

Which versions of bnpl-blocks-feature-partners are malicious?

The following npm versions of bnpl-blocks-feature-partners are flagged malicious: 35.9.1. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate bnpl-blocks-feature-partners if I installed it?

bnpl-blocks-feature-partners is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove bnpl-blocks-feature-partners, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.

I already installed bnpl-blocks-feature-partners — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If bnpl-blocks-feature-partners was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is bnpl-blocks-feature-partners part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — bnpl-blocks-feature-partners is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-015435 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find bnpl-blocks-feature-partners across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for bnpl-blocks-feature-partners (version 35.9.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging bnpl-blocks-feature-partners across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

bnpl-blocks-feature-partnersnpm

bnpl-blocks-feature-partners is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-12947) that typosquats a legitimate package to trick installs (malicious version 35.9.1). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

Malicious code in bnpl-blocks-feature-partners (npm)

MAL-2026-12947

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall bnpl-blocks-feature-partners

What this malware does

index.js unconditionally require()'s./ext.js, which on load selects a platform-specific endpoint, fetches an opaque binary from Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker.cf10{1,2,3}-*.workers.dev) reassembled from split string literals, with a DNS-TXT chunked base64 fallback via *.dl.wel1.ru subdomains, writes the payload to /var/tmp/.cache<hex> on Unix or %TEMP%\dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows, chmods it 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe /c start /b. Network destinations and sensitive API names (child_process, chmodSync) are reconstructed at runtime from split-string arrays to evade static scanners. No integrity check, no hash/signature verification, filename disguises (.cache_ / dotnet_diag_) mimic system caches, and the fetched code is unrelated to any stated package purpose. The dropper fires on any require() of this package.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

35.9.1

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

40f5d479d4fbf50975912fcbb27c8a3638cfeef78c8bd8a2e666162756abc788

Detection & response playbook

Typosquat

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for bnpl-blocks-feature-partners (version 35.9.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging bnpl-blocks-feature-partners across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
bnpl-blocks-feature-partners is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove bnpl-blocks-feature-partners, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If bnpl-blocks-feature-partners was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-feature-partners before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. bnpl-blocks-feature-partners on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 35.9.1 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-015435

References

npmjs.com

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-feature-partners-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring

Explore

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