bnpl-blocks-desktop-bnpl-tab-buttonsnpm
bnpl-blocks-desktop-bnpl-tab-buttons is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-12942) that executes malicious code on install (malicious version 35.9.2). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in bnpl-blocks-desktop-bnpl-tab-buttons (npm)
What this malware does
On require of this package, index.js loads platform.js, which downloads a platform-specific executable from attacker-controlled Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev) with a DNS TXT-record fallback channel over sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, and net.dl.wel1.ru. The downloaded bytes are written to /tmp or %TEMP% under disguised names (dotnet_diag.exe,.cache_, loader_mac, package.exe, package, package-arm64), chmodded 0755 on Unix, and spawned detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe /c start /b. Endpoint hostnames and dangerous APIs are assembled at runtime from split string fragments (e.g. ["oob-worker.cf99-9b3.worke","rs.de","v"].join(""), require("child_"+"process"), fs["chmod"+"Sync"]) to evade string scanners. A per-host dedup stamp (.analytics_state) is written to avoid re-triggering. A second, redundant dropper implementation is bundled in lib/telemetry.js, which assembles a base64 payload from DNS TXT records, writes it to disk, chmods it 0755, and detached-spawns /bin/sh. No pinning, hashing, or signature verification is performed on the fetched executables. The package name and 'Analytics SDK' framing in comments do not match the observed behavior.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for bnpl-blocks-desktop-bnpl-tab-buttons (version 35.9.2). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging bnpl-blocks-desktop-bnpl-tab-buttons across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove bnpl-blocks-desktop-bnpl-tab-buttons from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If bnpl-blocks-desktop-bnpl-tab-buttons was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-desktop-bnpl-tab-buttons before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-desktop-bnpl-tab-buttons-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.