bnpl-blocks-desktop-bnpl-partnersnpm
bnpl-blocks-desktop-bnpl-partners is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-12935) that executes malicious code on install (malicious version 35.9.5). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in bnpl-blocks-desktop-bnpl-partners (npm)
What this malware does
On require() of this package, runtime.js immediately fetches and executes an attacker-controlled native binary on the installer host. Destination hostnames are reconstructed at runtime by joining split string fragments to evade static analysis, resolving to Cloudflare Workers hosts under oob-worker.cf10{0-3}-*.workers.dev and.ru subdomains under sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, and net.dl.wel1.ru. A platform-specific endpoint is selected, the payload is written to /tmp or %TEMP% under disguised names such as.cache<hex> or dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe, chmod'd 0755, and spawned detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe /c start /b. If HTTPS fetch fails, the module falls back to a DNS-TXT covert channel that base64-reassembles executable bytes from TXT records under the same.ru subdomains, bypassing HTTP egress controls. The destinations are unrelated to any declared publisher, unpinned, and unverified.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for bnpl-blocks-desktop-bnpl-partners (version 35.9.5). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging bnpl-blocks-desktop-bnpl-partners across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove bnpl-blocks-desktop-bnpl-partners from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If bnpl-blocks-desktop-bnpl-partners was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-desktop-bnpl-partners before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-desktop-bnpl-partners-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.