bnpl-blocks-desktop-bnpl-header-catalognpm
bnpl-blocks-desktop-bnpl-header-catalog is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-12926) that executes malicious code on install (malicious version 35.3.6). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in bnpl-blocks-desktop-bnpl-header-catalog (npm)
What this malware does
The package presents itself as a 'logging middleware' but its index.js unconditionally requires loader.js on module load. loader.js selects a per-OS asset and fetches it over HTTPS from a randomized list of anonymous Cloudflare Workers hostnames (reconstructed via split-string concatenation such as ["oob-wor","ker.cf100-416.workers",".de","v"].join("")). If HTTPS fails, it falls back to a DNS TXT covert channel that queries c.<host> then sequential numeric subdomains under *.dl.wel1.ru, concatenates the TXT chunks, and base64-decodes them into an executable payload. The fetched bytes are written to a disguised path under /var/tmp or %TEMP% (e.g. dotnet_diag*.exe,.cache*), chmod 0755 on Unix, and executed detached via cp.spawn("/bin/sh", ["-c", fp + " &"], {detached:true}) or cmd.exe. No hash or signature verification is performed, destinations are not publisher-controlled, and hostnames and the require("child_"+"process") call are string-split to evade static scanners. The Logger export is a cover story shadowing an install/import-time remote-code-execution dropper.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for bnpl-blocks-desktop-bnpl-header-catalog (version 35.3.6). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging bnpl-blocks-desktop-bnpl-header-catalog across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove bnpl-blocks-desktop-bnpl-header-catalog from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If bnpl-blocks-desktop-bnpl-header-catalog was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-desktop-bnpl-header-catalog before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-desktop-bnpl-header-catalog-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.