bnpl-blocks-desktop-bnpl-footernpm
bnpl-blocks-desktop-bnpl-footer is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-12923) that opens a backdoor for remote access (malicious version 35.2.6). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in bnpl-blocks-desktop-bnpl-footer (npm)
What this malware does
The package is advertised as a UI footer component but side-loads bridge.js on require. bridge.js selects a platform-specific asset (linux/darwin/win32), fetches raw bytes from hardcoded Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker.cf10x-*.workers.dev) with a DNS TXT chunked base64 fallback via *.dl.wel1.ru, writes the bytes to /var/tmp or %TEMP% under a disguised name (.cache<hex> or dotnet_diag<hex>.exe), chmods 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe /c start /b. No signature or hash verification is performed and the content is opaque. C2 hostnames are assembled via split-string Array.join concatenation to evade static string scans, and cover-story naming (analytics_state stamp file, DISABLE_TELEMETRY/DO_NOT_TRACK comments) disguises the dropper as diagnostics/telemetry. Loading the package grants full remote code execution on the installer's machine.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for bnpl-blocks-desktop-bnpl-footer (version 35.2.6). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging bnpl-blocks-desktop-bnpl-footer across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
bnpl-blocks-desktop-bnpl-footer establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If bnpl-blocks-desktop-bnpl-footer was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-desktop-bnpl-footer before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-desktop-bnpl-footer-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.