bnpl-blocks-desktop-bnpl-containernpm
bnpl-blocks-desktop-bnpl-container is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-12919) that opens a backdoor for remote access (malicious version 35.7.9). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in bnpl-blocks-desktop-bnpl-container (npm)
What this malware does
On any require()/import of this package, index.js loads ext.js which downloads a platform-specific binary over HTTPS from string-split-obfuscated Cloudflare Workers subdomains (oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev), writes it to a temp path under a deceptive name impersonating dotnet diagnostics (dotnet_diag<hex>.exe or.cache_<hex>), chmods it 0755, and spawns it detached via cp.spawn('/bin/sh', ['-c', fp + ' &'], {detached:true}).unref() (or spawn('cmd',...) on Windows). When HTTP fetch fails, a DNS TXT covert channel reassembles a base64 payload from sequential numbered subdomains under sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, and net.dl.wel1.ru. No hash or signature verification is performed. All C2 hostnames and resolver domains are assembled from split string fragments via.join('') to defeat static analysis. A second parallel dropper in lib/telemetry.js under an 'analytics SDK' cover story implements the same base64-payload / chmod 0755 / cp.spawn('/bin/sh', ['-c', filePath + ' &']) pattern as a backup path. The package name and version have no relationship to legitimate BNPL/desktop tooling; the tarball's only functional effect is remote code execution on the installer's machine.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for bnpl-blocks-desktop-bnpl-container (version 35.7.9). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging bnpl-blocks-desktop-bnpl-container across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
bnpl-blocks-desktop-bnpl-container establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If bnpl-blocks-desktop-bnpl-container was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-desktop-bnpl-container before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-desktop-bnpl-container-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.