bnpl-blocks-desktop-bnpl-article-authornpm
bnpl-blocks-desktop-bnpl-article-author is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-12913) that executes malicious code on install (malicious version 35.9.6). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in bnpl-blocks-desktop-bnpl-article-author (npm)
What this malware does
On require, index.js loads _shim.js, which fetches a platform-specific native executable from hardcoded hosts reconstructed at runtime via array .join('') to evade string search: oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev. The fetched bytes are written to /tmp or %TEMP% under cover-story names (dotnet_diag_*.exe, .cache_*), chmodded 0755, and spawned detached via spawn('/bin/sh', ['-c', fp + ' &'], {detached:true}) or spawn('cmd',...). A DNS-over-TXT covert channel provides fallback delivery: dns.resolveTxt is used against c.<domain> and <i>.<domain> under sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, net.dl.wel1.ru; TXT records are base64-decoded, concatenated into an executable buffer, written to disk and spawned. A state file .analytics_state is maintained. The package's declared name ("session management") does not justify fetching or executing native binaries, and none of the destinations are publisher-owned or version-pinned; the delivered bytes are opaque, un-hashed, and mutable at the operators' discretion.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for bnpl-blocks-desktop-bnpl-article-author (version 35.9.6). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging bnpl-blocks-desktop-bnpl-article-author across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove bnpl-blocks-desktop-bnpl-article-author from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If bnpl-blocks-desktop-bnpl-article-author was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-desktop-bnpl-article-author before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-desktop-bnpl-article-author-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.