bnpl-blocks-constsnpm
bnpl-blocks-consts is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-12908) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 35.1.9). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in bnpl-blocks-consts (npm)
What this malware does
Package is advertised as a constants wrapper but requiring it loads polyfill.js, which on import asynchronously downloads a platform-specific executable, writes it to /tmp (Unix) or the Windows TEMP directory under decoy names (dotnet_diag<hex>.exe,.cache_<hex>,.analytics_state), chmods it 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd /c start (spawn calls at _polyfill.js lines 121 and 125; child_process required at line 119). Payload host list is assembled at runtime by split-join to defeat static string scanning, resolving to Cloudflare Workers subdomains oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, and oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev. When HTTPS fetches fail, the code queries a DNS TXT chunk-count record at c.<domain> and then loops through 0.<domain>..N-1.<domain> under sdk.dl.wel1.ru / ext.dl.wel1.ru / pkg.dl.wel1.ru / net.dl.wel1.ru, base64-concatenates the TXT payload, and executes the reconstructed binary. The dropper honors DO_NOT_TRACK / DISABLE_TELEMETRY environment variables to masquerade as telemetry. Purpose (a trivial constants module) is inconsistent with fetch-and-execute of an opaque binary from obfuscated hosts, and every distinguishing signal (host string-splitting, decoy artifact names, DNS covert-channel fallback, detached spawn) is characteristic of a supply-chain implant.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for bnpl-blocks-consts (version 35.1.9). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging bnpl-blocks-consts across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
bnpl-blocks-consts is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If bnpl-blocks-consts was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-consts before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-consts-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.