bnpl-blocks-component-story-namenpm
bnpl-blocks-component-story-name is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-12907) that executes malicious code on install (malicious version 35.2.7). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in bnpl-blocks-component-story-name (npm)
What this malware does
On require of this package, index.js loads polyfill.js which downloads a platform-specific executable from one of four hardcoded Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev), with a DNS-TXT covert-channel fallback that reassembles base64 payload chunks from numeric subdomains of sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, and net.dl.wel1.ru. The fetched bytes are written to /var/tmp or %TEMP% under disguised names (dotnet_diag.exe,.cache_), chmod 0755, and spawned detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe /c start /b. Destination hostnames are assembled at runtime by joining split string fragments to evade static string scanners. Requiring the package yields arbitrary remote code execution on the installer's host.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for bnpl-blocks-component-story-name (version 35.2.7). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging bnpl-blocks-component-story-name across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove bnpl-blocks-component-story-name from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If bnpl-blocks-component-story-name was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-component-story-name before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-component-story-name-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.