bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-togglenpm
bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-toggle is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-12899) that executes malicious code on install (malicious version 35.2.4). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-toggle (npm)
What this malware does
On require of the package, index.js loads./platform.js which fetches an opaque executable payload from obfuscated Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev) with a DNS TXT covert-channel fallback via *.dl.wel1.ru, writes it to /tmp or the Windows temp directory under a disguised name (.cache<rand> or dotnet_diag_<rand>.exe), chmods 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd. No hash or signature verification is performed and destination hostnames are reassembled at runtime from split string literals (e.g. ['oob-worker.cf101-adf.wo','rk','ers','.de','v'].join('')) to evade static analysis. A marker file /tmp/.analytics_state throttles re-execution. A second, parallel dropper is shipped in lib/telemetry.js: it base64-decodes a payload, chmods 0755 and spawns /bin/sh -c <path> &, with disguised API access (fs['chmod'+'Sync'], require('child_'+'process')) framed as an 'Analytics SDK'. Both files exhibit the same fetch-write-chmod-spawn pattern.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-toggle (version 35.2.4). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-toggle across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-toggle from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-toggle was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-toggle before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-toggle-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.