bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-store-button-setnpm
bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-store-button-set is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-12897) that typosquats a legitimate package to trick installs (malicious version 35.6.9). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-store-button-set (npm)
What this malware does
On require() of the package, index.js loads support.js which downloads a platform-specific binary from string-split-obfuscated Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker.cf*.workers.dev) with a DNS TXT fallback under sdk.dl.wel1.ru, writes it to /tmp or %TEMP% under a disguised name such as.cache<hex> or dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe, chmods 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd. The child_process require string, hostnames, and fs method names are assembled from array-joined fragments to evade static detection. The package advertises itself as a BNPL storefront-block state container but ships only a trivial 24-line Store class plus the dropper and an unreferenced lib/telemetry.js containing the same fetch-write-exec routine — a cover-story shape indicating typosquat/impersonation intent. Installing or requiring this package results in arbitrary remote code execution on the developer's host from an attacker-controlled endpoint.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-store-button-set (version 35.6.9). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-store-button-set across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-store-button-set is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-store-button-set, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-store-button-set was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-store-button-set before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-store-button-set-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.