bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-store-buttonnpm
bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-store-button is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-12896) that executes malicious code on install (malicious version 35.2.8). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-store-button (npm)
What this malware does
The package's main (index.js) requires ./_loader at module load, causing _loader.js to download a platform-specific native executable from hardcoded Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev) whose hostnames are reassembled at runtime via Array.join string splitting to evade static scanners. If HTTPS fetches fail, a secondary channel retrieves base64-encoded chunks from DNS TXT records under *.dl.wel1.ru and reassembles them into the binary payload. The downloaded bytes are written to /tmp or %TEMP% under disguised filenames (.cache_<hex>, dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe), chmod'd to 0755 on Unix, and spawned detached via cp.spawn("/bin/sh", ["-c", fp + " &"]) or spawn("cmd",...) on Windows. No hash or signature verification is performed. Any require() or import of this package triggers full-host remote code execution. A second file, lib/telemetry.js, is not on the auto-executed graph in this version but contains structurally identical dropper primitives (base64 buffer to /bin/sh -c filePath &, chmod 0755, cp.spawn), mirroring the active loader.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-store-button (version 35.2.8). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-store-button across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-store-button from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-store-button was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-store-button before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-store-button-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.