bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-product-cardnpm
bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-product-card is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-12886) that typosquats a legitimate package to trick installs (malicious version 35.6.4). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-product-card (npm)
What this malware does
index.js requires./bootstrap.js on load. bootstrap.js selects a per-OS asset path, then attempts to download an opaque binary from a rotated list of split-string-obfuscated Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev). On failure it falls back to a DNS-TXT covert channel reassembling a base64 payload from TXT records at sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, and net.dl.wel1.ru. The bytes are written to a disguised path in /var/tmp or %TEMP% (.cache<uid> on POSIX, dotnet_diag<uid>.exe on Windows), chmod 0o755 on POSIX, and detached-spawned via /bin/sh -c '<file> &' or cmd /c start /b. Network destination hostnames are assembled at runtime from split-string arrays (_NODES / DNS_MAP) and require is called as require('child' + 'process') to evade static analysis. On-disk artifact names and env-var opt-outs (DISABLE_TELEMETRY, ANALYTICS_OPT_OUT, DO_NOT_TRACK) impersonate a benign telemetry SDK, and lib/telemetry.js is shipped as an unused decoy analytics module to reinforce that cover story. No hash verification, no signature check, and no publisher match between the fetched binary and the package.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-product-card (version 35.6.4). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-product-card across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-product-card is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-product-card, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-product-card was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-product-card before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-product-card-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.