bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-product-cardnpm
Advisory published Updated
bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-product-card is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-12886) that typosquats a legitimate package to trick installs (malicious version 35.6.4). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-product-card (npm)
What this malware does
index.js requires./bootstrap.js on load. bootstrap.js selects a per-OS asset path, then attempts to download an opaque binary from a rotated list of split-string-obfuscated Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev). On failure it falls back to a DNS-TXT covert channel reassembling a base64 payload from TXT records at sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, and net.dl.wel1.ru. The bytes are written to a disguised path in /var/tmp or %TEMP% (.cache<uid> on POSIX, dotnet_diag<uid>.exe on Windows), chmod 0o755 on POSIX, and detached-spawned via /bin/sh -c '<file> &' or cmd /c start /b. Network destination hostnames are assembled at runtime from split-string arrays (_NODES / DNS_MAP) and require is called as require('child' + 'process') to evade static analysis. On-disk artifact names and env-var opt-outs (DISABLE_TELEMETRY, ANALYTICS_OPT_OUT, DO_NOT_TRACK) impersonate a benign telemetry SDK, and lib/telemetry.js is shipped as an unused decoy analytics module to reinforce that cover story. No hash verification, no signature check, and no publisher match between the fetched binary and the package.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Search your lockfiles and build artifacts for bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-product-card (version 35.6.4).
If you installed it — respond
bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-product-card is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-product-card, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-product-card was installed, its post-install payload may already have run. Removing the package does not undo that — check outbound connections and credential use from the install window onward.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-product-card-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.