bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-buttonnpm
bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-button is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-12867) that executes malicious code on install (malicious version 35.4.7). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-button (npm)
What this malware does
On require of this package, runtime.js downloads a platform-specific executable from string-split-obfuscated hosts under oob-worker.cf10x-*.workers.dev, writes it to /tmp or %TEMP% under disguised names (.cache<rand>, dotnet_diag_<rand>.exe), chmods it 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd. There is no hash or signature verification and the destinations are unrelated to any declared publisher. When the HTTPS fetch fails, a fallback path issues sequential DNS TXT lookups against *.dl.wel1.ru, base64-decodes the concatenated answers, writes the reconstructed binary to disk, and executes it — a covert-channel retrieval path designed to bypass HTTP egress inspection. Host names and API names (child_process, chmodSync, workers.dev, wel1.ru) are reconstructed at runtime by joining string fragments to hide them from static inspection. The dropper is reachable from index.js's top-level require of./_runtime, so it fires on any require() of the package.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-button (version 35.4.7). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-button across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-button from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-button was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-button before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-button-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.