bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-anchor-menunpm
bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-anchor-menu is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-12863) that opens a backdoor for remote access (malicious version 35.8.5). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-anchor-menu (npm)
What this malware does
On require of bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-anchor-menu, index.js loads loader.js which assembles hostnames from split-string arrays (evading static analysis), selects a platform-specific asset, and downloads an opaque executable via https.get from Cloudflare Workers subdomains (oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev) with a DNS-TXT base64 fallback resolving sdk.dl.wel1.ru / ext.dl.wel1.ru / pkg.dl.wel1.ru / net.dl.wel1.ru. The fetched bytes are written to /tmp or the Windows temp directory under cover-story names (dotnet_diag.exe,.cache_), chmodded 0755 on POSIX, and spawned detached via cp.spawn("/bin/sh", ["-c", fp + " &"], {detached:true}).unref() (spawn("cmd") equivalent on Windows). The package's declared purpose is a UI anchor menu, which does not require fetching or executing native binaries from anonymous workers.dev hosts. A sibling module lib/telemetry.js contains a parallel dropper implementation with the same chmod-and-spawn primitives, activating if imported directly. The combination of split-string obfuscation of destination hosts, cover-story staging paths, anonymous workers.dev C2 with a Russian DNS-TXT covert channel, and unconditional execute-on-require constitutes remote code execution against every installer that requires the package.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-anchor-menu (version 35.8.5). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-anchor-menu across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-anchor-menu establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-anchor-menu was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-anchor-menu before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-anchor-menu-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.