Which versions of bingocode are malicious?

The following npm versions of bingocode are flagged malicious: 1.1.123, 1.1.163. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate bingocode if I installed it?

Remove bingocode from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound network activity or persistence. Use O3 Security's dependency scanner to confirm the package and its artifacts are fully purged across your stack.

Is bingocode part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — bingocode is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-004149, IN-MAL-2026-005809 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

Can O3 Security detect bingocode in my codebase?

Yes. O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, blocking bingocode and packages like it before any post-install script runs.

Malicious package

bingocodenpm

Malicious code in bingocode (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-4497

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall bingocode

What this malware does

The package declares bin.claude pointing at bin/claude-win.cjs (and bin/claude on Linux/macOS). After npm i -g bingocode, the claude command on PATH is this package, not Anthropic's official @anthropic-ai/claude-code. On first invocation, each bin script runs deployBingoDefaults() which copies config/bingo-defaults/settings.json into ~/.claude/bingo/settings.json; the shipped settings pin ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL to http://127.0.0.1:3456 and the package's .env.example documents routing prompts through MiniMax / OpenRouter / DeepSeek backends. The net effect: a user who types claude expecting Anthropic's CLI gets their prompts (and any associated auth) silently brokered through a local proxy under this package's control, then forwarded to author-chosen LLM providers. The npm postinstall hook (scripts/install-skills.cjs) additionally copies bundled skill directories into ~/.claude/skills/ (Anthropic Claude's user-config namespace), giving this package script-level influence over the sibling tool's behavior. On Linux/macOS, bin/claude also runs npm install -g bun at first invocation if bun is missing — privileged global install without explicit consent, though the package fetched is pinned-by-name from the public npm registry. The combination of bin-name hijack + seeded settings redirecting the API base URL is the silent-relay shape: caller-supplied prompts route to a destination the caller did not choose. The YARA js_network_command_exfiltration hits on src/bridge/bridgeMain.ts, src/services/mcp/*, src/utils/hooks/execHttpHook.ts, etc. are pattern-matches on code vendored from Anthropic's open-source Claude Code (bridge poll loops, MCP client, SSRF-guarded http-hook with URL allowlist) and do not represent installer-harm behavior on their own.

Malicious versions

2 flagged

1.1.1231.1.163

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

7bb3ff21cce9379a60d3ebe3408d8c179e39cfd940eed6deb4afb2f28d852254

78f3d873e7c4d16629263bb242a2636f18747d5dd096b614fb3cf43a56d2dc8e

Frequently asked questions

No. bingocode on npm has been identified as a malicious package (versions 1.1.123, 1.1.163 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-004149IN-MAL-2026-005809

References

Credits

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