What does the bigops-data-storage malware do?

On require() of bigops-data-storage, index.js loads _compat.js which unconditionally runs a top-level routine that downloads a native executable from hardcoded Cloudflare Workers hosts (reconstructed via array-join, e.g. 'oob-worker.cf101-a'+'df.workers.de'+'v') with a DNS-TXT fallback to *.dl.wel1.ru (counted subdomains 'c. ', '0. ', '1. ' concatenated and base64-decoded). The fetched bytes are written to /tmp/.cache_ on Unix or %TEMP%\dotnet_diag_ .exe on Windows, chmod'd 0755, and executed detached via cp.spawn('/bin/sh',['-c', fp+' &'],{detached:true}).unref() or cmd.exe. Destination hostnames, the child_process import, and fs.chmodSync are assembled through

Which versions of bigops-data-storage are malicious?

The following npm versions of bigops-data-storage are flagged malicious: 35.7.1. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate bigops-data-storage if I installed it?

Remove bigops-data-storage from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.

I already installed bigops-data-storage — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If bigops-data-storage was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is bigops-data-storage part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — bigops-data-storage is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-014409 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find bigops-data-storage across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for bigops-data-storage (version 35.7.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging bigops-data-storage across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

bigops-data-storagenpm

bigops-data-storage is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-12163) that executes malicious code on install (malicious version 35.7.1). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

Malicious code in bigops-data-storage (npm)

MAL-2026-12163

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall bigops-data-storage

What this malware does

On require() of bigops-data-storage, index.js loads compat.js which unconditionally runs a top-level routine that downloads a native executable from hardcoded Cloudflare Workers hosts (reconstructed via array-join, e.g. 'oob-worker.cf101-a'+'df.workers.de'+'v') with a DNS-TXT fallback to *.dl.wel1.ru (counted subdomains 'c.<domain>', '0.<domain>', '1.<domain>' concatenated and base64-decoded). The fetched bytes are written to /tmp/.cache<hex> on Unix or %TEMP%\dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows, chmod'd 0755, and executed detached via cp.spawn('/bin/sh',['-c', fp+' &'],{detached:true}).unref() or cmd.exe. Destination hostnames, the child_process import, and fs.chmodSync are assembled through string-splitting and property-name concatenation ('child_'+'process', 'chmod'+'Sync'), and payload filenames are disguised as 'dotnet_diag_*.exe' / '.analytics_state' with cover-story comments referencing telemetry and opt-out. A second, unreferenced dropper module lib/telemetry.js in the same tarball reimplements the same fetch-decode-chmod-spawn flow as an 'Analytics SDK'.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

35.7.1

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

3b56d364976ed784e51324fe29d849cb6ac3495d32a5474e98eaf19ae7a308d0

Detection & response playbook

Malicious package

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for bigops-data-storage (version 35.7.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging bigops-data-storage across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove bigops-data-storage from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If bigops-data-storage was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks bigops-data-storage before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. bigops-data-storage on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 35.7.1 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-014409

References

npmjs.com

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks bigops-data-storage-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring

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