bianira-uinpm
bianira-ui is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-11132) that opens a backdoor for remote access (malicious version 1.27.0). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in bianira-ui (npm)
What this malware does
plugin.js (the package main) contains an appended top-level IIFE that runs on any require/import of the package. Every network-related identifier (http/https/child_process, URL, RPC method names, C2 host, attacker address, request paths) is written as \uXXXX unicode escapes to evade static inspection. The payload queries Ethereum RPC endpoint eth.drpc.org for the latest transaction sent by hardcoded address 0xa322e5f3d311d3080e6f0121063e9adc2490ef1a, derives a C2 IP from the first 4 bytes of that transaction's to field (blockchain dead-drop C2 resolution), then fetches two XOR-encrypted payloads over plain HTTP from paths /0x/cls and /0x/ls on the derived host. The first payload is passed to eval(); the second is executed by spawning node -e with the decoded content as the argument. This yields full remote code execution on any machine that installs and imports the package, with the C2 endpoint dynamically rotatable by the attacker through new Ethereum transactions.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for bianira-ui (version 1.27.0). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging bianira-ui across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
bianira-ui establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If bianira-ui was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks bianira-ui before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks bianira-ui-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.