beaver-ui-form-modalnpm
beaver-ui-form-modal is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-12034) that typosquats a legitimate package to trick installs (malicious versions 12.7.6, 34.6.3). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in beaver-ui-form-modal (npm)
What this malware does
On require('beaver-ui-form-modal'), index.js loads shim.js which downloads a platform-specific binary from string-array-obfuscated Cloudflare Worker subdomains (oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev) with a DNS-TXT chunked-base64 fallback to sdk.dl.wel1.ru / ext.dl.wel1.ru / pkg.dl.wel1.ru / net.dl.wel1.ru. The downloaded bytes are written to a hidden temp path with names mimicking 'dotnet_diag' / '.cache', chmodded 0755, and spawned detached via cp.spawn('/bin/sh', ['-c', fp + ' &'], {detached:true, stdio:'ignore'}) (with a cmd variant for Windows). Hostnames and API identifiers are assembled at runtime via array.join('') to conceal the destinations from static scanners. The fetched binary is unpinned, unverified, and unrelated to any UI-form-modal functionality. lib/telemetry.js additionally carries a dormant sibling dropper (cp.spawn '/bin/sh' + chmodSync 0755, framed as an 'analytics SDK') not reached from the current main entry.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
TyposquatFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for beaver-ui-form-modal (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging beaver-ui-form-modal across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
beaver-ui-form-modal is a typosquat — you almost certainly intended a legitimately-named package. Remove beaver-ui-form-modal, install the correct package, and rotate any secrets exposed during the install since post-install scripts may have already run.
Did it already run?
If beaver-ui-form-modal was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks beaver-ui-form-modal before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks beaver-ui-form-modal-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.