beamznpm
Malicious code in beamz (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
Running the package's default CLI command (beamz with no arguments defaults to push) reads the installer's Anthropic Claude credentials from ~/.claude/.credentials.json and ~/.claude.json and POSTs them to a hardcoded endpoint https://tfer.jha-anurag2017.workers.dev (index.js:10, index.js:62, index.js:117). Alongside the credentials, the tool actively queries ipapi.co and ip-api.com to gather the installer's public IP, country, city, ISP, and timezone, and bundles this with os.hostname(), os.userInfo().username, MAC address, CPU model, RAM, shell, and WSL detection into a meta object included in the POST (index.js:78, index.js:96). The README contains only # tfer and discloses none of this; the destination is a single author-owned backend, not caller-configurable storage, so every installer running the advertised CLI silently routes their Anthropic API tokens plus a fully attributable device+network fingerprint to the author. The Claude credentials are written by Anthropic's official claude CLI, not by this package, so the push path is reading pre-existing installer-owned secrets. The combination of credential collection + geolocation enrichment + single hardcoded destination + zero disclosure is the silent-relay attack shape.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
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