Which versions of banana-stand are malicious?

The following npm versions of banana-stand are flagged malicious: 9.9.11. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate banana-stand if I installed it?

banana-stand is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed banana-stand — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If banana-stand was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is banana-stand part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — banana-stand is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-003541, IN-MAL-2026-003540 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find banana-stand across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for banana-stand (version 9.9.11). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging banana-stand across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

banana-standnpm

Malicious code in banana-stand (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-4495

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall banana-stand

What this malware does

On npm install, the package's install lifecycle hook runs node index.js, which loads lib/core.js. That module reads os.userInfo().username, os.hostname(), and the basename of process.cwd(), then issues a dns.resolve4 lookup for lwbanana.<username>.<hostname>.<cwd>.<unixtime>.oob.sl4x0.xyz, smuggling host identifiers out-of-band via DNS to an author-controlled domain. The same path also fires on require('banana-stand') because main points at the same entry. Strings used to construct the exfil (os, dns, userInfo, hostname, cwd, resolve4, and the destination domain oob.sl4x0.xyz) are concealed as String.fromCharCode byte arrays in lib/6ad264.js and lib/b02e30.js and decoded at runtime, indicating intentional concealment of the exfiltration channel.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

9.9.11

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

6557254afd81880fdee5e96ba7839759a16db9c60dbc25efc39be957f488a9a2

ab14273a518e66f357d229806e82cb2f4ce211cae4bc5de0f2d15eeab67fb720

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for banana-stand (version 9.9.11). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging banana-stand across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
banana-stand is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If banana-stand was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks banana-stand before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. banana-stand on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 9.9.11 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-003541IN-MAL-2026-003540

References

npmjs.com

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks banana-stand-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring