aws-blognpm

package.json declares a dependency whose key equals the package's own name (aws-blog) with a value of https://repo.securityctrl.com/aws-blog instead of a registry version range. On npm install, npm fetches whatever tarball bytes that URL currently returns and installs it, running any lifecycle scripts inside it. There is no version pin and no integrity hash, so the executed code is whatever the operator of repo.securityctrl.com serves at install time and can change silently between installs. The shipped source is an inert stub, so the manifest line is the entire published surface of the package. The dependency-confusion shape (self-named key, implausibly high 45.0.0 version to win resolution against an internal aws-blog, host unrelated to any AWS or npm infrastructure) further indicates targeting of installers who expect an internal package by this name.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.