awaitly-mongonpm
awaitly-mongo is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-5237) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious versions 0.1.1, 1.0.1, 2.0.1…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in awaitly-mongo (npm)
What this malware does
No concrete installer-harm signals were identified in this package version. The package name suggests a MongoDB-related async helper, but no specific behavior could be confirmed from the available artifacts. Without traced evidence of exfiltration, install-time remote execution, credential access, or other supply-chain attack patterns, a public block verdict is not warranted. Routing to human review so a maintainer can confirm the package's contents and intent before any disposition is published.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
The Miasma malware is a self-propagating worm that spreads across the npm registry by abusing weaponized binding.gyp files to achieve execution during package installation, bypassing security tools that only inspect package lifecycle scripts. Upon execution, the malware attempts to exfiltrate credentials and OIDC tokens for various cloud and registry services, and propagates by compromising other packages managed by the stolen accounts or committing backdoor files to GitHub repositories.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for awaitly-mongo (24 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging awaitly-mongo across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
awaitly-mongo is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If awaitly-mongo was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks awaitly-mongo before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks awaitly-mongo-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.