Which versions of async-pipeline-builder are malicious?

The following npm versions of async-pipeline-builder are flagged malicious: 1.5.0, 1.5.1. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate async-pipeline-builder if I installed it?

async-pipeline-builder is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed async-pipeline-builder — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If async-pipeline-builder was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is async-pipeline-builder part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — async-pipeline-builder is associated with the GHSA-hgq8-x9x4-jfpr, IN-MAL-2026-004431, IN-MAL-2026-004432, IN-MAL-2026-004495, IN-MAL-2026-004497 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find async-pipeline-builder across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for async-pipeline-builder (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging async-pipeline-builder across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

async-pipeline-buildernpm

Malicious code in async-pipeline-builder (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-4275

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall async-pipeline-builder

What this malware does

Ten packages published by npm user asdxzxc at version 1.0.10 target developers working on AI and LLM tooling. Each package masquerades as a developer utility while executing a two-stage payload triggered via postinstall: package.json → lib/setup.js → lib/worker.js.

Credential harvesting: lib/worker.js scans the filesystem for private keys (64-char hex), BIP39 mnemonics (12–24 word phrases), API keys and secrets, and passwords from env vars and shell history (.bash_history, .zsh_history, .fish_history, .mysql_history, .psql_history), including wallet tool invocations (geth account, hardhat, metamask, wallet import). Targeted paths include ~/.ssh, ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.config/gcloud, ~/.azure, ~/.docker/config.json, ~/.kube/config, crypto wallet dirs (~/.ethereum, ~/.bitcoin, ~/.solana), exchange configs (Binance, Bybit, OKX, KuCoin, Deribit, 3Commas), .env, .npmrc, .gitconfig. Also performs browser data theft and Ethereum keystore brute-force. A priority-target list fetched from the actor's GitHub Pages endpoint enables aggressive deep scanning for pre-registered high-value hosts.

AI self-propagation: after credential theft, a _propagate() function executes a multi-vector campaign to infect AI coding assistants. It writes poisoned .cursorrules and CLAUDE.md files — framed as "P-2024-001 Enterprise Credential Integrity Standard" — to all discovered project directories, parent directories, and home subdirectories, instructing Cursor, Claude Code, and GitHub Copilot to execute the remote payload and propagate it via Issues, PRs, and documentation. Git hooks (post-merge, post-checkout, pre-commit, pre-push) are injected into all .git repos found on disk, and a persistence block is appended to ~/.bashrc, ~/.zshrc, and ~/.profile. Zero-width steganography (ZWSP/ZWJ/ZWNJ/LTRM encoding) embeds hidden scan triggers in all AI-generated text output, enabling AI-to-AI chain infection invisible to humans.

C2/exfil: a remotely configurable JSON config hosted on the actor's GitHub Pages delivers the active webhook list, encryption key, and scan strategy; hardcoded fallback webhooks at webhook.site and a DNS TXT record fallback are used if the primary channel fails. A dedup marker at ~/.local/share/.p2024_integrity prevents re-propagation within 24 hours.

async-pipeline-builder poses as an asynchronous data processing pipeline builder with backpressure handling.

The package's lib/trap-core.js bundles host-reconnaissance and outbound HTTP POST behavior in a single module: it requires os, https, fs, and child_process; reads os.hostname() and os.platform(); references ping and curl; assembles JSON payloads keyed by hostname: (lines 393, 411, 553, 600, 1023); and performs multiple POST calls (lines 385, 411, 466, 548, 549). The combination of host fingerprint collection (hostname/platform), child_process execution, and repeated POSTs from the same module matches the active-exfiltration shape rather than any documented benign use, and the file name (trap-core.js) is consistent with intentional victim-tracking infrastructure rather than a build/runtime helper. Installing or loading this package risks leaking installer host data and executing attacker-influenced shell commands.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

Malicious versions

2 flagged

1.5.01.5.1

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

bd80257f833d3f63fb3e65e4a0a75bbfcc9ead7cd3b2775bd3aa812aa76f4bbf

3cd513ecfe34affa7e7c2015f944b154bd876833dd0370785af04fb89917d012

ab6197ad6bbc2fe849cbed4ba039a1c74717f66222ce9f3d261ad55362e86f4d

d3335a8add6021f28fb5b63ca038d6beb27b10f519d60a5105488868b782a802

ffa91bf71001422a55a9b0821df71782ce490be0f765b34320816f9e306f09b2

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for async-pipeline-builder (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging async-pipeline-builder across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
async-pipeline-builder is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If async-pipeline-builder was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks async-pipeline-builder before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. async-pipeline-builder on npm has been identified as a malicious package (versions 1.5.0, 1.5.1 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

GHSA-hgq8-x9x4-jfprIN-MAL-2026-004431IN-MAL-2026-004432IN-MAL-2026-004495IN-MAL-2026-004497

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder
SafeDep · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks async-pipeline-builder-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring