Which versions of arnext-arkb are malicious?

The following npm versions of arnext-arkb are flagged malicious: 0.0.2. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate arnext-arkb if I installed it?

arnext-arkb is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed arnext-arkb — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If arnext-arkb was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is arnext-arkb part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — arnext-arkb is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-004832 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find arnext-arkb across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for arnext-arkb (version 0.0.2). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging arnext-arkb across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

arnext-arkbnpm

Malicious code in arnext-arkb (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-4483

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall arnext-arkb

What this malware does

package.json declares "preinstall": "./bin/install-deps", which points at a 976,568-byte Linux x86-64 ELF executable shipped in the tarball with no source, no build system, and no documentation. The binary is run as the installing user on every npm install. Strings inside the ELF include LIBBPF, PTRACE, HTTP/1.1, POST, USERPROFILE, and Ed25519 — capabilities (eBPF, process tracing, HTTP POST, cross-platform home-directory paths, key handling) that are unrelated to an Arweave deploy CLI. The package is also a clear impersonation of the legitimate Arweave arkb tool: it declares "bin": { "arkb": "./bin/app.js" } so npx arkb resolves to this package, its commands.js duplicates the real arkb help output (arkb ${command + usage}), and it lists @textury/ardb as a dependency to ride on the textury/Arweave brand. The combination of a typosquat lure plus an opaque preinstall native binary with no matching source is the canonical install-time-RCE / dropper pattern: any developer who runs npm install arnext-arkb (or installs it transitively) executes attacker-controlled native code under their own account before any other code runs.

This package was compromised as part of the IronWorm campaign. This campaign executes a malicious binary payload during installation via a preinstall hook. The payload is a Rust-built infostealer that targets developer environments, scanning for and harvesting credentials related to cloud providers, object storage, databases, source-control, package registries, and AI developer tools. It also targets cryptocurrency wallets, specifically injecting a malicious JavaScript hook into the Exodus desktop wallet to capture passwords and recovery phrases. Furthermore, the malware exhibits worm-like behavior by stealing GitHub and NPM credentials to push malicious updates to the victim's repositories and publish trojanized packages, and it uses an eBPF-based kernel rootkit to hide its processes and network connections on Linux systems.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

0.0.2

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

87f9eda6644870362103de6f3bf1877efb1039c4b2b771343bcf6c38f216ecc0

146faaf0d97c6a533a969bc3f3f117811f9317dc865ed4ab37f1679842ddeaae

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for arnext-arkb (version 0.0.2). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging arnext-arkb across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
arnext-arkb is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If arnext-arkb was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks arnext-arkb before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. arnext-arkb on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 0.0.2 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-004832

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks arnext-arkb-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring