Which versions of arnext are malicious?

The following npm versions of arnext are flagged malicious: 0.1.5. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate arnext if I installed it?

arnext is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed arnext — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If arnext was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is arnext part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — arnext is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-004828 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find arnext across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for arnext (version 0.1.5). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging arnext across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

arnextnpm

Malicious code in arnext (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-4482

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall arnext

What this malware does

package.json declares "preinstall": "./vendor/setup", which runs a 976,568-byte Linux ELF binary on every npm install. The package's stated purpose is a small React/Next.js Arweave routing helper (dist/esm/index.js) — there is no documented or structural reason for it to ship or execute a native binary. The binary is packed/obfuscated (mostly non-printable string output, no README or docs explaining its role) and is invoked solely from the install lifecycle hook, with no source, build script, or hash verification accompanying it. Extracted strings include LIBBPF_0.0, ~PTRACE, /proc references, USERPROFILE, https://, HTTP/1.1, GitHub API version 2022-11-28, Ed25519, RSA_PKCS1_, and POST/DELETE verbs — fingerprints consistent with a credential-harvesting / GitHub-API-abusing payload with anti-debug instrumentation. The binary is not version-pinned to any publisher release, not hash-verified, and the package's advertised purpose is unrelated to any of the binary's apparent capabilities. This matches the opaque-native-binary-with-doc-mismatch and generic-binary-runner-dropper attack patterns: arbitrary attacker-controlled native code executes on every installer's machine without consent or inspectability.

This package was compromised as part of the IronWorm campaign. This campaign executes a malicious binary payload during installation via a preinstall hook. The payload is a Rust-built infostealer that targets developer environments, scanning for and harvesting credentials related to cloud providers, object storage, databases, source-control, package registries, and AI developer tools. It also targets cryptocurrency wallets, specifically injecting a malicious JavaScript hook into the Exodus desktop wallet to capture passwords and recovery phrases. Furthermore, the malware exhibits worm-like behavior by stealing GitHub and NPM credentials to push malicious updates to the victim's repositories and publish trojanized packages, and it uses an eBPF-based kernel rootkit to hide its processes and network connections on Linux systems.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

0.1.5

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

9d689a27b5cc929562b684a7181549d3770de331a9f57120881d8060294b6e5f

146faaf0d97c6a533a969bc3f3f117811f9317dc865ed4ab37f1679842ddeaae

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for arnext (version 0.1.5). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging arnext across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
arnext is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If arnext was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks arnext before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. arnext on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 0.1.5 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-004828

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks arnext-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring