Which versions of argoncrypt are malicious?

The following npm versions of argoncrypt are flagged malicious: 1.2.1, 1.2.3. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate argoncrypt if I installed it?

argoncrypt establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.

I already installed argoncrypt — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If argoncrypt was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is argoncrypt part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — argoncrypt is associated with the GHSA-h3m2-g8jh-9p37, IN-MAL-2026-005989, RLMA-2026-04943, RLUA-2026-05497 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find argoncrypt across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for argoncrypt (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging argoncrypt across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

argoncryptnpm

Malicious code in argoncrypt (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-5506

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall argoncrypt

What this malware does

On require, index.js spawns a detached, unref'd Node child running lib/initializeCaller.js. That file decodes a base64-disguised URL (https://tomato-brunhilda-40.tiiny.site/index.json), fetches the response, and invokes it via new Function.constructor('require', response)(require) — granting the fetched code full Node capability with access to require. The destination is an anonymous free static-site host with no pinning, hash check, or signature verification; the fetch is retried up to 5 times. The C2 URL and HTTP header values are hidden as base64 strings stored under fake process.env.DEV_* defaults to evade casual review and string-search. The package additionally masquerades as a pino logger transport (exports module.exports.pino, ships a smoke:pino script, references a non-existent ./pino module) despite a name unrelated to logging — a cover story for the dropper. Any developer or build system that installs and imports argoncrypt will silently execute attacker-controlled code with full host privileges.

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

Malicious versions

2 flagged

1.2.11.2.3

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

94563f3221aa73ae8a4de5195a6f6a3e8cef16eb4c1f03bc8d1adc9ce9b72679

ca59273c7d2b5b7797e301ab861354081dbbb6c47209858459be0ada49036167

a4968792dada6912b98cb6cd48353ae1f34304affea75c59a90c48a72ec387d3

7c5fa602ddc303f0b2d76831aeb02ecb00849bddfea2acbfdc0c3afbf61b6996

Detection & response playbook

Backdoor / remote access

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for argoncrypt (2 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging argoncrypt across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
argoncrypt establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If argoncrypt was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks argoncrypt before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. argoncrypt on npm has been identified as a malicious package (versions 1.2.1, 1.2.3 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

GHSA-h3m2-g8jh-9p37IN-MAL-2026-005989RLMA-2026-04943RLUA-2026-05497

References

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder
ReversingLabs · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks argoncrypt-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring

Explore

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