arc-diag-utilnpm
arc-diag-util is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-4481) that opens a backdoor for remote access (malicious version 1.0.1). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in arc-diag-util (npm)
What this malware does
On npm install, the package's postinstall hook runs id to capture the installer's uid/gid/group identity and opens a raw TCP socket to host.docker.internal:9999, writing the command output to that listener. The package's declared main (index.js) is a two-line stub exporting {} — there is no library functionality, the postinstall beacon is the package's sole purpose. host.docker.internal resolves to the Docker host from inside a container, so the pattern is specifically designed to escape sandboxed CI/build containers and report installer identity to a listener on the build host. The hollow library body combined with a generic 'diagnostic utility' name is consistent with a dependency-confusion attempt against an internal package name.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for arc-diag-util (version 1.0.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging arc-diag-util across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
arc-diag-util establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If arc-diag-util was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks arc-diag-util before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks arc-diag-util-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.