api-rs-nodenpm
api-rs-node is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-4348) that opens a backdoor for remote access (malicious versions 4.3.0, 4.3.1, 4.3.2). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in api-rs-node (npm)
What this malware does
A campaign of npm packages sharing a common dropper (clob.js) that downloads and persistently installs a Windows executable from IPFS on postinstall. The dropper fetches the binary from IPFS CID bafybeif3zkapj364ofnrvbty7oj5h5ufpxlp4s62usk3ulxrru35e3gssa via multiple public gateways (Pinata, Cloudflare, ipfs.io), drops it to %LOCALAPPDATA%, registers Windows Registry persistence under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run using a hidden VBScript wrapper (window style 0, no taskbar entry), launches the payload immediately, and reports the victim's public IP address to a hardcoded C2 server via HTTP POST. macOS and Linux stubs are present but not yet configured. Developer artifacts bundled in config/meta_data.json leak the attacker's build path: E:\getting IP and check list\clob-downloader\.
api-rs-node masquerades as a high-performance Rust-native Node.js module. Its postinstall script runs clob.js, which downloads windows defender host.exe from IPFS and drops it to %LOCALAPPDATA%\windows defender host.exe to blend in with legitimate Windows Defender processes. The C2 beacon transmits the victim's public IP to http://170.205.31.203:2026/api/urls. No executable is bundled in the tarball; the payload is fetched entirely from IPFS at install time.
The package advertises itself as a Rust↔Node.js bridge but ships only an obfuscated postinstall script (clob.js) and no Rust or Node bindings. On npm install, the postinstall hook runs clob.js, which: (1) downloads a Windows executable from a hardcoded IPFS CID via Pinata/Cloudflare/ipfs.io gateways (e.g. https://violet-tricky-quelea-562.mypinata.cloud/ipfs/<CID>), drops it to %LOCALAPPDATA% as windows defender host.exe, and spawns it hidden via wscript.exe with no hash or signature verification; (2) registers persistence across all three major platforms — HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run on Windows (via a VBS launcher), ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.clob.agent.plist + launchctl load on macOS, and ~/.config/autostart/clob.desktop on Linux — so the dropped binary auto-starts on every boot/login; (3) resolves the installer's public IP via api.ipify.org and POSTs it to a hardcoded bare-IP C2 at http://170.205.31.203:2026/api/urls?url=<ip>. All sensitive identifiers (require('https'), execSync, spawn, LOCALAPPDATA, the disguised filename, wscript.exe, autostart paths) are unicode-escaped or constructed from reversed strings to evade scanners. The README contains a your-package-name placeholder and the package name impersonates the napi-rs / Rust-Node native-addon ecosystem.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Backdoor / remote accessFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for api-rs-node (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging api-rs-node across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
api-rs-node establishes remote access, so treat any host that installed it as fully compromised. Isolate the machine, remove the package, rotate all credentials it could reach, and rebuild from a trusted image rather than cleaning in place — a backdoor may have planted additional persistence.
Did it already run?
If api-rs-node was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks api-rs-node before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
- SafeDep · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks api-rs-node-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the C2 callback and severs the channel.