anthropic-internal-toolsnpm
Malicious code in anthropic-internal-tools (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
Package name impersonates the Anthropic namespace and ships a preinstall hook (scripts.preinstall = 'node index.js') that executes on every npm install. index.js performs bulk reads of installer-side credential files from the home directory — ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.aws/config, ~/.config/gcloud/application_default_credentials.json, ~/.azure/accessTokens.json, ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub (and probes id_rsa), ~/.npmrc, ~/.gitconfig — and uses execSync to curl AWS IMDS (http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/) and GCP metadata (http://metadata.google.internal, Metadata-Flavor: Google) to capture IAM/service-account tokens. It also collects os.hostname(), os.userInfo(), cwd, and environment variables matching KEY|TOKEN|SECRET|PASS|AUTH|CRED|AWS|GCP|AZURE|NPM|REGISTRY. The beacon is POSTed via https.request to a hardcoded collector at https://webhook.site/2d1764b2-1249-4793-840f-7846d7d820cd. Installing this package on a developer workstation or CI runner discloses long-lived cloud credentials, SSH keys, and registry tokens to a third-party endpoint, and on cloud-hosted CI additionally yields short-lived IAM/service-account tokens usable to pivot into the installer's cloud account. The package self-describes as a 'dependency confusion PoC', confirming the namespace-impersonation intent against an internal Anthropic-named package.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for anthropic-internal-tools (3 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging anthropic-internal-tools across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
anthropic-internal-tools is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If anthropic-internal-tools was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks anthropic-internal-tools before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks anthropic-internal-tools-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.