analysis-chartnpm
Malicious code in analysis-chart (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
What this malware does
The package's postinstall hook (install-hook.js, invoked via package.json scripts.postinstall) fetches an opaque binary 'payload.bin' from https://github.com/Dimitrijenco/Sticky_note/releases/download/v6/payload.bin — a third-party GitHub release on an account unrelated to the package's claimed author. The downloaded bytes are XOR-decrypted with key 0x42, then loaded into the installer's process: kernel32.dll is loaded via koffi, RWX memory is allocated with VirtualAlloc, the decrypted PE is copied via RtlMoveMemory, VirtualProtect is applied, and CreateThread is started at the parsed PE entry point. This is in-memory shellcode/PE injection on Windows developer machines, executing arbitrary attacker-controlled native code on npm install. After launching the payload, install-hook.js writes a cleanup.js that, after a 3-second delay, runs cmd /c rmdir /s /q on the package folder, removes 'analysis-chart' from the host project's package.json, unlinks install-hook.js, and self-deletes — anti-forensic evidence removal so the developer cannot inspect what ran. The package's index.js exposes a plausible-looking chart statistics API (stats, outliers, trend, correlation, movingAverage, analyze) that is functionally unrelated to install-hook.js and serves as decoy cover; author metadata 'Elena Vogt [email protected]' and the referenced repo appear fabricated.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Destructive / sabotageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for analysis-chart (21 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging analysis-chart across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
analysis-chart carries a destructive/sabotage payload. Remove it immediately, restore any affected data from clean backups, and verify integrity of build outputs that may have been tampered with.
Did it already run?
If analysis-chart was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks analysis-chart before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks analysis-chart-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.