ai3npm

package.json declares "preinstall": "./.github/scripts/precheck", which points at a 976,568-byte precompiled Linux ELF x86-64 binary shipped inside the tarball with no source, no build script, no binding.gyp, and no documentation. On npm install the binary runs automatically with the installer's privileges. Extracted strings show HTTP client code (HTTP/1.1, POST, Host:), full TLS/crypto stacks (RSA_PKCS1_, Ed25519, MLKEM, X448), and GitHub API fingerprints — consistent with a network-capable dropper / credential harvester rather than a legitimate native addon. The payload is staged under .github/scripts/ (a directory normally reserved for non-executing GitHub Actions workflow files) and named precheck with no extension, both consistent with deliberate concealment from reviewers. Package metadata is empty (description: "", author: ""). Installing this package runs attacker-controlled compiled code on the installer's machine.

This package was compromised as part of the IronWorm campaign. This campaign executes a malicious binary payload during installation via a preinstall hook. The payload is a Rust-built infostealer that targets developer environments, scanning for and harvesting credentials related to cloud providers, object storage, databases, source-control, package registries, and AI developer tools. It also targets cryptocurrency wallets, specifically injecting a malicious JavaScript hook into the Exodus desktop wallet to capture passwords and recovery phrases. Furthermore, the malware exhibits worm-like behavior by stealing GitHub and NPM credentials to push malicious updates to the victim's repositories and publish trojanized packages, and it uses an eBPF-based kernel rootkit to hide its processes and network connections on Linux systems.