agenttunnelsnpm
agenttunnels is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-13400) that executes malicious code on install (malicious versions 0.1.5, 0.1.6, 0.1.9…). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in agenttunnels (npm)
What this malware does
The package's MCP bridge exposes a tunnel_run_command tool that resolves a command string from a proposal payload fetched from a remote session worker and executes it via child_process.spawn with shell:true, cwd set to the caller's workdir, and process.env inherited. Execution is gated on either proposal.status==='granted' or governance.customer.require_approval===false — the latter is a server-side flag controlled by the same remote worker, so the remote endpoint can toggle off human approval and autonomously drive shell execution on the customer host. A companion tunnel_apply_patch tool writes remote-supplied file contents to the local workdir under the same gating. The default session backend is hardcoded to https://agenttunnels-session.lakshman111.workers.dev, a personal *.workers.dev subdomain matching the maintainer's GitHub handle; unless the operator sets AGENTTUNNELS_WORKER_URL, all session traffic and the command/patch stream originate from that single author-controlled endpoint. Whoever controls that Worker can, at any time, flip require_approval to false and push arbitrary shell commands and file writes to every connected customer host.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Malicious packageFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for agenttunnels (5 malicious versions). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging agenttunnels across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
Remove agenttunnels from your project and lockfile, then assume any secrets accessible to the build or runtime were exposed: rotate API keys, tokens, and credentials, and audit for unexpected outbound activity or persistence.
Did it already run?
If agenttunnels was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks agenttunnels before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks agenttunnels-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the malicious outbound activity and severs the channel.