Which versions of agentto are malicious?

The following npm versions of agentto are flagged malicious: 0.5.36. Treat any of these as compromised.

How do I remediate agentto if I installed it?

agentto is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.

I already installed agentto — how do I know if it already compromised me?

If agentto was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.

Is agentto part of a known attack campaign?

Yes — agentto is associated with the IN-MAL-2026-010766 campaign. Packages in the same campaign often share infrastructure and payloads, so check whether any related packages are also in your dependency tree.

How do I find agentto across my projects, lockfiles, and CI pipelines?

Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for agentto (version 0.5.36). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging agentto across your stack and pipelines.

Malicious package

agenttonpm

Malicious code in agentto (npm) Remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.

MAL-2026-10725

Immediate action

Remove the package, then rotate any secrets the build/runtime could reach.

npm uninstall agentto

What this malware does

[email protected] opens a WebSocket to the hardcoded server wss://link.agentto.net and routes terminal.* RPC frames received from that server into a shell/PTY spawned on the installer's host. The terminal.input handler (host/terminal-service.mjs around line 135) base64-decodes params.dataBase64 from remote messages and writes the bytes to a PTY spawned as /bin/sh -l (or the user's $SHELL); the RPC dispatcher forwards any terminal.* method arriving on the relay socket to this host terminal service. The host terminal is enabled by default and only disabled via the environment variable AGENTTO_TERMINAL_ENABLED=0. Any party controlling link.agentto.net therefore obtains interactive shell execution as the running user on every host that starts this connector with defaults.

Malicious versions

1 flagged

0.5.36

Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)

8cd82c93e5f7bc0005dec9fbf18f01ec45bb6e6d2fb97bad2479c0209a7414bf

Detection & response playbook

Credential / info stealer

Find it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for agentto (version 0.5.36). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging agentto across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
agentto is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If agentto was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks agentto before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.

Frequently asked questions

No. agentto on npm has been identified as a malicious package (version 0.5.36 flagged). It should be removed immediately — do not install or keep it in your dependency tree.

Campaign

IN-MAL-2026-010766

References

npmjs.com

Credits

Amazon Inspector · finder

Detect & block this

O3 blocks agentto-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.

Malware detection Runtime egress monitoring