action-slack-message-rootnpm
action-slack-message-root is a confirmed malicious npm package (MAL-2026-16323) that steals credentials and exfiltrates sensitive data (malicious version 1.0.1). Do not install it — remove it immediately and rotate any exposed credentials.
Malicious code in action-slack-message-root (npm)
What this malware does
package.json declares scripts.preinstall = 'node index.js', which runs automatically on npm install. index.js collects host reconnaissance — os.hostname(), os.platform(), os.arch(), os.release(), os.uptime(), os.cpus(), memory info, and the output of shell commands whoami, id, pwd, and uname -a via child_process — and POSTs the JSON payload over plain HTTP to a hardcoded Burp Suite Collaborator subdomain at http://x86cmb7n60gbagfm4fdws0nw5nbjzanz.oastify.com. The package name resembles legitimate Slack-notification tooling, but the shipped code performs only reconnaissance exfiltration with no advertised functionality. The tarball also declares an unpinned dependency on openmct-heatmap ^1.0.1, consistent with a dependency-confusion / research-probe shape.
Malicious versions
Indicators of compromise (SHA-256)
Detection & response playbook
Credential / info stealerFind it
Scan your lockfiles (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, etc.) and build artifacts for action-slack-message-root (version 1.0.1). O3 Security's supply-chain scanner checks every dependency against known-malicious package intelligence at install time and in CI, flagging action-slack-message-root across your stack and pipelines.
If you installed it — respond
action-slack-message-root is built to steal secrets, so assume every credential the build or runtime could read is compromised. Remove it from your project and lockfile, then rotate ALL exposed secrets — npm/registry tokens, cloud keys, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and any .env values — from a known-clean machine. Audit logs for unauthorized use of those credentials.
Did it already run?
If action-slack-message-root was ever installed, its post-install/runtime payload may have already executed. O3's L7 egress monitoring and runtime eBPF sensors detect the credential exfiltration or command-and-control callback after install and block the malicious outbound channel, so you catch and contain the actual compromise — not just the presence of the package.
How O3 protects you
O3 blocks action-slack-message-root before install through its supply-chain scanner, and if it has already run, detects and severs the exfiltration or C2 callback at runtime through L7 egress monitoring and eBPF.
Frequently asked questions
Campaign
References
Credits
- Amazon Inspector · finder
Detect & block this
O3 blocks action-slack-message-root-class packages before install and in CI — and if it already ran, its runtime egress monitoring catches the credential exfiltration and severs the channel.